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What room for a common 
Anglo-German agenda?
The instincts driving EU policy
Anglo-German relations receive little attention, despite 
being two of  the largest member states without whom 
the EU could not function, and who with France form 
the “big three” of  Europe. No formal basis exists for 
high-level British–German meetings, though infor-
mal talks do take place; both nations have historically 
prioritized relations with France. This is changing to 
some extent. Franco-German relations have cooled 
over the last few years, and Angela Merkel has built up 
a relationship of  mutual respect with Gordon Brown. 
The visit by Jim Murphy (UK Minister for Europe) to 
his counterpart in Berlin in late June 2008 also points 
to a genuine interest in cultivating closer ties.
Yet to drive a common European agenda requires a 
common vision of  Europe, and here lies the prob-
lem. Germany pursues the ideal of  an “ever closer 
union”, still inspired by the same reasons that led to 
the founding of  the European project fifty years ago. 
Consequently, Germany sometimes appears attached 
to the idea of  “Europe for the sake of  Europe”. The 
UK, on the other hand, joined Europe primarily for 
functional reasons, and still mainly assesses the EU on 
what it can deliver for its citizens. Murphy admitted 
that the UK is “much more interested in the Lisbon 
agenda for jobs and growth than in the Lisbon Trea-
ty—by instinct”. It is these “instincts” on both sides 
which continue to govern European policy, and which 
manifest themselves in diverging policies, for example, 
on energy or defense. While common interests do ex-
ist—we all want security and stability—Europe’s pre-
cise role in such matters is disputed. This fundamental 
disagreement on the purpose of  Europe subsequently 
impacts upon political will to work towards a com-
mon agenda—and does little to counter institutional 
stagnation.
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Disappointed by the Irish rejection of  the Lisbon Treaty, both British and German governments are seek-
ing ways to counter stagnation within the EU. What potential—indeed, what political will—exists for a 
deeper Anglo-German cooperation, and how can this be utilized to push Europe forward? Constructive 
bilateral relations would undoubtedly promote mutual interests whilst also benefiting multilateral efficiency. 
And common interests do exist: on areas such as climate change or Africa, Germany and the United King-
dom see eye to eye. Changes of  leadership have also helped patch up relations since the era of  Schröder and 
Blair. Yet the two nations approach Europe in exceedingly different ways. The respective impulses which 
led them to join the European project in the first place still govern the way in which each perceives its place 
in Europe, and Europe’s place in the world. Germany and the UK do not share the same basic views on 
issues as fundamental (and as divisive) as enlargement, Turkey, policy towards Russia—in short, on what 
Europe is for. This was above all evident in Jim Murphy’s vision of  the EU, presented at the DGAP 
on June 30th, 2008, one which, if  in doubt, places functionality above institutions—a Europe that can 
deliver.
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Policy priorities
Of  course, one should not underestimate the areas of  
agreement, where consensus is reached quickly be-
tween the UK and Germany. For Günter Gloser (Ger-
man Minister for Europe), the UK and Germany rep-
resent the “decisive motors” behind climate policy; the 
commitments secured during last year’s Spring Council 
are testament to this. While Murphy approached the 
issue from a more economic perspective, for example 
in his ambitions to raise the number of  “green col-
lar workers” to one million in the next two decades, 
environment policy is clearly one area where Germany 
and the UK want to take a leading role. Equally, the 
focus of  Merkel and Tony Blair on Africa during their 
respective G8 presidencies, and the by now converging 
approaches towards the United States are indicative 
of  similar policy priorities. Great Britain, said Murphy, 
may take a rather more “pragmatic” approach to Eu-
rope, but it is “still passionate about creating a ‘model 
Europe’—a force for good in the world”. Both gov-
ernments frequently reiterate the desire for a Europe 
that can act on the world stage; neither wants, as one 
participant put it, after Robert Kagan, a Europe that 
is “like the chorus in a Greek tragedy—commenting 
on events but with little or no impact on the outcome.” 
Cooperation within the so-called EU-3 (with France) 
in dealing with Iran is one example of  the added value 
of  teaming up.
That said, substantial differences of  approach arise in 
areas such as energy policy, defense and social policy. 
Mr. Murphy spelled out clearly the British commitment 
to further liberalization of  energy markets; Germany 
and the UK may have the same overarching needs, but 
this does not mean they agree on how to fulfil them. 
British analysts still hold Germany largely responsible 
for the lack of  a common EU Russia policy, even if  
Germany has modified its position in recent years. It 
remains to be seen what emerges from the negotiations 
for a new partnership agreement with Russia. Germany 
is also seen as an obstacle from the UK perspective 
in reaching a common defense policy. The British are 
bewildered by Germany’s reluctance to invest more 
in defense: does Germany simply wish to become “a 
big Switzerland”? In the ten years that have passed 
since the St. Malo agreement, there is still no common 
strategic defense culture in Europe, and from a Brit-
ish perspective, this is a responsibility which Germany 
in particular has shirked. Different visions are also 
evident in British and German perspectives of  what a 
“social Europe” should look like. Social policy remains 
a national competence, and the UK emphasis on lib-
eralization and flexible labor markets is not shared by 
Germany to the extent that Britain wishes. Hopes for 
Anglo-German cooperation to combat the anti-liberal-
ization backlash may therefore prove unrealistic.
There does seem to be willingness on both sides to 
work through trickier issues. Gloser’s inclusion of  
justice and home affairs as an “area of  cooperation” 
between Britain and Germany was less a recogni-
tion of  past successes than an indication of  future 
potential. But what concrete form would a deepened 
cooperation take? An institutionalized dialogue tak-
ing its cue from the multi-faceted Franco-German 
structures? High-level discussions on a formal basis 
would likely achieve less than informal meetings. And 
whereas creating the platform for talks would certainly 
force regular communication to take place, there is 
understandably a reluctance to set up an institution for 
its own sake. While the idea of  a “big three” coalition 
with France was floated, policy-makers showed little 
support for publicly forming an “exclusive club”; in 
any case, behind the scenes such meetings already take 
place.
Institutional reform—and the purpose of Europe
The results of  the Irish referendum were acknowl-
edged as symptomatic of  a broader, Europe-wide 
dissatisfaction with the EU. But Germany and Britain 
have responded to the current paralysis in Brussels in 
ways which reflect their differing priorities. The Brit-
ish view is that Lisbon should not be overestimated: 
progress can still be made without it. Political will, 
much more so than institutions, is the deciding factor 
in making things happen. The German side tends to 
DGAPaktuell 2008/4 3
What room for a common 
Anglo-German agenda?
see the issue from an institutional perspective. While 
Minister Gloser recognized that the reasons behind 
the Irish “no” had to be further analyzed, he expressed 
impatience to implement the Treaty, if  only to be done 
with eight years of  inaction. Understandably, most 
Europeans are tired of  talking about institutions. But 
while the German government would rather push 
through the Treaty—seeing this as a precondition for 
further action—for Murphy, waiting around is not an 
option. This is not only because the issues themselves 
require urgent attention, but also because it is through 
its substance, rather than its institutions, that Europe 
remains relevant to its citizens. This concerns others, 
too. The new American president, trying to find his 
footing in relations with the EU, will be frustrated if  
Europe remains preoccupied with internal matters.
From the continental perspective, euroscepticism 
among the British public seems a lost cause; Murphy 
himself  admitted that a recent poll found only 14% to 
be in favor of  the ratification of  the Reform Treaty. In 
Germany—as elsewhere—Gordon Brown is increas-
ingly being dismissed as a “lame duck”. His recent 
decision to continue the ratification process was wel-
comed with gratitude by Germany, and seen as a sign 
that the UK government was, after all, committed to 
institutional reform. But this would be a dangerous as-
sumption, not least given the Conservative party’s likely 
return to power. If  even former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair—under much more favorable economic and 
political conditions—stopped short of  moving Britain 
into “core” Europe, it is unrealistic to expect further 
rapprochement under less ideal circumstances. The To-
ries may see the EU in purely economic terms; as one 
commentator put it, “they just don’t get the political 
side of  the EU.” But reluctance towards institutional 
change transcends party politics in Britain. Murphy was 
unequivocal in his insistence that Lisbon marks “the 
end of  the era of  institution-building”. The British 
government has no interest in more treaties.
How then does the UK envisage the EU in twenty 
years’ time? More effective, economically stronger—
and continually expanding. German participants could 
not help but wonder at this attitude, seemingly all 
about “enlargement, but for heaven’s sake no deepen-
ing.” Murphy reiterated the British commitment to 
opening the door to any state wishing to enter, pro-
viding membership criteria are fulfilled. This marks a 
drastic divergence from the German vision of  Europe. 
This being the case—where does Turkey fit into the 
common agenda?—does political will even come into 
the question?
Realistic expectations
Minister Gloser claimed that Anglo-German rela-
tions could become one of  the most important pillars 
within Europe. Everyone is impatient to begin looking 
outwards again and to tackle issues of  substance, our 
external partners included. But how can bilateral coop-
eration push Europe forward, when the two partners 
do not even agree where “forward” is? Admittedly, 
cooperation may be propelled by sheer necessity on 
matters such as security. But the division between a 
strategic or functional view of  Europe (Murphy: “We 
will always ask whether EU activity and legislation adds 
value”) and an institutionally driven, idealistic view is 
not something that can be addressed by a mere change 
in national leadership. In this context, we should have 
realistic expectations of  what can be achieved on a 
bilateral basis. The inherent difference of  opinion that 
exists between the UK and Germany should at least 
serve to reassure those who are fearful of  too much 
harmonization within Europe. It will certainly be some 
time before Europe looks all the same.
The conference took place on June 30th, 2008 at the 
DGAP in Berlin.
Speakers: 
Jim Murphy, UK Minister of State and Minister for Europe 
Günter Gloser, German Minister of State for Europe
Panelists: 
Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform, London 
Dominic Schroeder, The British Embassy in Berlin 
Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, Federal Chancellery, Berlin 
Jan Techau, DGAP
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